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Abstract 
 This chapter examines narratives of constitutionalism and the ebb and flow of 
constitutional ideas and practices within and across the European Union and its 
Member States from the inception of the treaties to the present day. It seeks to 
establish to what extent the European Union manifests a ‘constitutional’ legal and 
political order. It focuses on the contribution of legal rules to developing 
constitutional structures, as well as the role of ideas in relation to legal rules. The 
original objectives of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of European integration 
concerned the promotion of peace, prosperity and a form of non-nationalist 
supranationalism. In many respects, the EU has been remarkably successful, given the 
history of the European continent right through to the middle of the twentieth century. 
The ‘constitutionalised treaties’ have been at the heart of that success. But now we 
must pay attention to recent challenges, resulting from the financial crisis, the travails 
of the Eurozone, problems in the EU’s near abroad, and the arrival of large numbers 
of refugees at and beyond the external borders of the EU. In an era of national 
reactions against neo-liberalism and globalisation, the role of the EU and specifically 
of the Court of Justice of the EU is increasingly under question. 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines narratives of constitutionalism and the ebb and flow of 
constitutional ideas and practices within and across the European Union and its 
Member States from the inception of the treaties to the present day. The underlying 
question is this: to what extent does the European Union manifest a ‘constitutional’ 
legal and political order? Alongside that question is the one that inevitably arises in 
the context of a dynamic regional integration project such as the EU, which is the 
question of change. Is the EU changing in terms of its engagement with constitutional 
ideas and practices, and if so is it to be understood as becoming more, or less, 
constitutional over time? 
Methodologically, of course, this raises extremely difficult questions: how do 
we evaluate and ‘measure’ the ‘level’ of constitutionalism within a polity, especially 
one that is not a state? This chapter adopts a normative approach, in the sense that it 
assesses above all the role of legal rules in underpinning the content of a 
constitutional framework, and it gives priority to the treaties and to the role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, it does not deny the social 
content of constitutionalism, especially issues of legitimacy. Consequently, we also 
need to take into account the context of the ebbs and flows of legal rules. What types 
of changes to the (economic, political and geopolitical) environment in which the EU 
and the Member States operate have made most difference to the constitutional 
dimension of European integration? 
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To answer these questions, we need a definition of ‘constitutionalism’. This 
chapter adopts the terms set by the introduction to this Handbook. We can assess 
issues of constitutionalism across the dimensions of the rule of law, the balance or 
separation of powers, and the notion of a constituent power. As we shall see in the 
conclusion, the choice of these elements of focus for global constitutionalism is 
highly consequent for the European Union. For the EU as a legal and political order 
has long reflected its constituent Member States’ highly ambivalent engagement with 
many aspects of popular sovereignty in the postwar period, as a reaction to the 
totalitarian past. This had led, in the view of Müller (2016), to a preference for the 
fragmentation of power and a suspicion of populist politics that has spilled over into 
expectations about what the EU is, and what it should do. We will return to this theme 
at the end of this chapter. As we shall see, in many ways nothing has changed. And 
yet everything has. 
  
A handbook on constitutionalism written twenty to thirty years ago would 
have been unlikely to feature the European Union (i.e. what was then the ‘European 
Communities’) as one of its case studies. It would have focused on national case 
studies, and perhaps the migration of constitutional ideas across state borders. Only a 
narrow cadre of scholars of European Community law might have pressed the 
argument that European integration was, from the beginning, to be understood as 
more than ‘just’ an international pact about trade and that this ‘project’ was well on 
the way, by the 1980s, to evincing distinctive constitutional features stemming from 
its supranational legal order. More generally, of course, the very idea of global 
constitutionalism was at best a marginal concept in the 1980s, and even well into the 
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1990s. But in the second decade of the 21st century, the world looks – especially from 
an institutional perspective – very different, with many global and regional 
international institutions that are based on legal frameworks with quasi-constitutional 
characteristics and functions and supported by the discourses of ‘rule of law’, ‘human 
rights’ and ‘separation of powers’, even whilst the status and effectiveness of such 
institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, continue to be contested. 
In that context, the European Union lies at the very heart of a radically 
changed institutional and normative landscape, which has sometimes been 
characterised, perhaps prematurely, as a ‘postnational’ world. This chapter examines 
the evolution of this landscape, moving forward from well-trodden ‘historical’ terrain 
towards more recent, and less well-understood developments. In the conclusion, we 
return to the question of ‘what type of EU constitutionalism in what type of world’, 
applying a brief critique of the utility of the idea of ‘postnationalism’ in the context of 
rising tides of populist politics and politicians, in the EU, in the EU’s neighbourhood 
and elsewhere in the world. 
An ever-changing union with shifting narratives of constitutionalism 
Despite the relatively recent emergence of a formal narrative of 
constitutionalism into the public discourse of the European Union and its institutions, 
in fact many of the ‘constitutional’ features of the EU have been well established as 
legal doctrines since the 1960s and 1970s. This can be attributed to decades of fairly 
consistent activism based on a teleological approach to the interpretation of legal texts 
on the part of the CJEU when it came to the shaping of the core features of the 
European Union’s legal order in view of its often implicit and sometimes explicit 
understanding of the ‘project’ of European integration. This is what we should term 
the ‘constitutionalisation of the treaties’.  
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The CJEU handed down a series of formative judgments1 that put in place key 
legal concepts such as the direct effect, direct applicability and the primacy of EU 
law. Together these established what came to be seen, from the perspective of EU 
law, as a hierarchy between national law and EU law, with the latter taking 
precedence over the former and being directly enforceable within domestic legal 
systems. Over time, this case law became well known not just amongst lawyers, but 
also across a wider circle of specialists on European integration, although it rarely if 
ever received much public attention. As a result prevailing national myths about what 
the EU was or is, and what is was not or is not have tended to dominate public 
discourse at the national level. 
One of the leitmotivs of this constitutionalisation process was the emphasis on 
the uniform application of (what is now) European Union law within and across the 
Member States, and the role of national courts and national institutions in enforcing 
the law in a multi-level constitutional system (Tridimas 2015). The possibility and – 
in some circumstances – the requirement for national courts to refer questions of 
European Union law which arose in cases before them to the CJEU for a ruling on 
interpretation (or where appropriate a ruling on the validity of EU law measures) has 
been a crucial connection between the two systems. Originally Article 177 EEC, this 
reference procedure is now to be found in Article 267 TFEU. To put it another way, 
an embryonic European Community constitutional structure was heavily dependent 
upon a central legal core based on a uniform conception of supranational law 
enforceable by national courts as well as by the CJEU. This is a phenomenon that 
political scientists often termed ‘legal integration’. In addition, the CJEU also worked 
through concepts of fundamental rights and ‘legal basis’ (i.e. the scope of EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	   Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  ECLI:EU:C:1963:1;	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v.	  ENEL	  ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.	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competences) in order to develop the autonomy of the EU legal order, and to 
strengthen the claim that it is based on the rule of law and human rights. The Court 
was not afraid of the idea of constitutionalism; in the 1986 case of Les Verts,2 it 
described the treaties as the European Community’s ‘constitutional charter’. 
Many have argued that the CJEU, in this case law, was channelling the spirit 
of ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ as one of the original aims of the 
European integration process, owing much to the intention of the original 
functionalist framers of the treaties, such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann and 
Walter Hallstein. This phrase was contained in the Treaty of Rome 1957, and has 
survived into the current Treaty on European Union which now underpins the EU, at 
least until its durability and cohesive spirit was called into question by the UK’s so-
called renegotiation of its terms of membership, prior to the UK EU Referendum of 
June 2016. In fact, the CJEU rarely mentioned this phrase, but tended to use instead 
formalist justifications based on the notion of a community ‘under law’.3 Moreover, 
the CJEU’s position was never legally and constitutionally unassailed, especially on 
the part of the constitutional courts of (some of) the Member States. Since the legal 
framework underpinning European integration is a multilevel system incorporating 
both a ‘supranational’ and a ‘national’ level, the role of the Member States needs to 
be taken into account. The German Federal Constitutional Court in particular has been 
noticeable for adopting a position that accords on a conditional ‘primacy’ to EU law, 
based on its understanding of the primary reference point for its work being those 
parts of the German constitutional framework which sustain the nature of Germany as 
a sovereign state. These claims are incompatible with the claims made by the CJEU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	   Case	  294/83	  Parti	  écologiste	  "Les	  Verts"	  v.	  European	  Parliament	  ECLI:EU:C:1986:166.	  3	  	   Opinion	  1/91	  Draft	  EEA	  Agreement	  ECLI:EU:C:1991:490.	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about the character and primacy of EU law, but for decades the two courts have 
avoided coming directly into conflict with each other (Pernice 2014). 
Yet in parallel with these legal developments, the political dimension of the 
European integration process in other spheres seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, 
with the Member States and European institutions seemingly making little substantive 
progress on core tasks such as the completion of the single market, let alone the 
creation of a common commercial policy, the establishment of a common external 
border, the removal of passport controls and identity checks at internal frontiers, or 
the creation of a single currency and a monetary union. While to some extent the 
problems could be put down to exogenous factors such as the oil crises of the 1970s 
and the widespread recession in the global economy in the 1980s, in general the 
diagnosis given for the paralysis was that there were too many intergovernmental 
blockages in the legislative process so that the European Community was, for the 
most part, not working as intended. These blockages were only partially offset by 
supranational judicial developments guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Treaty-
based market freedoms. To put it another way, negative integration (i.e. the 
application of those parts of the Treaty prohibiting certain types of national barriers or 
restrictions, e.g. on goods or services) did not fully compensate for the absence of 
positive integration, in the form of, say, common standards for the goods and services 
to be traded across borders within the so-called ‘common market’. It was sometimes 
said at the time that the European Communities seemed to be in last chance saloon by 
the middle of the 1980s. 
It was at this point that a group of heads of state and government 
predominantly from centre right parties joined forces with a Commission President 
from the centre left (Jacques Delors) to agree upon the political necessity of 
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completing what came to be known as the ‘single market’ (essentially the common 
market, with an additional political spin). The main selling points concerned the 
benefits for citizens from enhanced economic integration; politicians rarely 
highlighted the possibility of offering enhanced guarantees of ‘social Europe’ (e.g. 
more secure and effective employment protection) through measures taken at the EU 
level. 
To give effect to this political impulse, the Member States negotiated the 
Single European Act, as the first treaty substantially to amend the treaties of the 
1950s. It was intended to kick start the completion of the single market, the creation 
of a frontier-free Europe and the finalisation of the common external border for goods 
in particular. It led the Member States, with baby steps initially, along the road 
towards greater cooperation across borders in the areas of justice and home affairs and 
foreign and security policy. One significant change was the development of a 
legislative procedure which required only a qualified majority in the Council of 
Ministers and which gave greater powers to the European Parliament. After some 
tweaking in subsequent treaties, this procedure has emerged as the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’, installing the European Parliament as co-legislator alongside 
the Council for many fields of EU law. It now covers not only core market matters 
including state aid, regulated markets and competition law, but also many important 
flanking policies such as environmental policy and regional policy, and has been 
introduced to an ever greater extent even in more sensitive areas such as Justice and 
Home Affairs and social policy. 
The Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force in 1986, was only 
the first in a rash of new treaties, which have incrementally redesigned what we now 
call the European Union in such a way as to make it more closely resemble, in 
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approach and activities, the federal or confederal level in a federal state or a 
confederation rather than an international organisation. There was a gradual accretion 
of competences at the EU level, alongside an increased willingness to exercise those 
competences. This has meant a de facto alignment of the EU and many constitutional 
ideas and a fair amount of litigation that has tested the scope of both internal and 
external competences. In addition, from 1989 onwards it became apparent that the EU 
was going to need to adjust rapidly to profoundly changed geopolitical circumstances 
in Europe and Eurasia, with enlargement policies and a new neighbourhood policy 
(both policies still incomplete) now on the agenda. But as we shall see, the impulse to 
enhance European integration through treaty change has not gone unchallenged at the 
national level. 
First came the Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993 after 
initial rejection by the Danish electorate in a referendum followed by subsequent 
approval. Reassuring noises on issues that concerned Denmark and its citizens were 
made by the other Member States in the form of a non-binding Declaration, some 
elements of were built into subsequent treaties. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the 
notion of ‘European Union’, creating a ‘pillar structure’ to draw out distinctions 
between ‘core matters’ managed according to the so-called ‘community method’ 
(involving the European Parliament) and areas of intergovernmental cooperation in 
the fields of justice and home affairs and foreign and security policy, and created the 
legal framework for the introduction of the euro as a single currency. The concept of 
‘subsidiarity’, intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen, was introduced by this Treaty, as well as the legal figure of the ‘citizen of the 
Union’. As a legal concept, EU citizenship is based on the national citizenship laws of 
the Member States, as only nationals of the Member States are EU citizens. 
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The Treaty of Maastricht presented a dilemma for the EU institutions and the 
Member State governments. On the one hand, it represented an important political 
step away from a primarily utilitarian and economistic justification for European 
integration, based on trade and markets. On the other hand, it was the first European 
treaty to be rejected in a popular referendum (although an earlier ‘political’ treaty in 
the area of defence cooperation in the 1950s had failed a parliamentary ratification 
hurdle in France). This raised the spectre and possibility that the citizens of the 
Member States might not actually want ‘more Europe’, even though steps such as the 
removal of internal borders (Schengen) and the creation of the euro currency (at least 
initially) were popular. This was a new equation for political elites to try to figure out, 
and it remains unsolved more than 20 years later. From that time onwards, 
Eurosceptic tropes arguing that the EU has a ‘democratic deficit’, that there is a gulf 
between the Union and its institutions and ordinary citizens, and that Union has been 
illegitimately eroding the national sovereignty of its Member States have never been 
far below the surface of the ongoing debate about the trajectory of the EU. However, 
the primary response of the Union institutions and the Member States has in fact been 
to press on with treaty development intensively for most of the two following 
decades, adding many features to the EU as a political and legal structure that could 
be viewed as more ‘constitutional’ in nature. The political rationale for doing so was 
that such changes also made it easier for the Union to act in what was seen to be the 
best interests of citizens – in terms of promoting their security, their prosperity and 
their capacity to live peacefully together. In terms of the legitimacy of the EU and its 
rule-making, this raises many complexities. In the search to do more and better at the 
EU level, the Member States have not always paid attention to how arguments about 
democratic legitimation in a multi-level polity can mesh effectively. That is to say 
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that in many respects the argument that the process of EU rule-making enjoys a 
double democratic legitimation through the role of the (nationally elected and 
legitimated) Council of Ministers and the (supranationally elected) European 
Parliament gains little traction with ‘ordinary’ voters who find it opaque and 
intransparent. 
In addition, Member States buttressed these formal developments with 
important extra-legal changes, notably the introduction of the so-called ‘Copenhagen 
criteria’, which determine whether or not a candidate Member State qualifies for 
membership of the Union. For our purposes, the most important of these criteria are 
the political ones: respect for democracy, human rights, rule of law and protection of 
and respect for national minorities. Eventually, these criteria were incorporated in the 
treaties, and now appear as foundational values of the EU in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and are referenced in Article 49 TEU concerned with the 
accession of new Member States. 
The second of the major revising treaties was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
entered into force in 1999. This treaty, negotiated at a point in the political cycle when 
the EU had a majority of centre left governments, strengthened and mainstreamed 
cooperation in justice and home affairs, and social policy, and enhanced the EU treaty 
provisions on fundamental rights and the right to non-discrimination. Following very 
rapidly on the heels of the Treaty of Amsterdam came the Treaty of Nice. Signed 
already in early 2001, the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice was delayed until 
2003 by the need to hold a second referendum in Ireland. This treaty was intended to 
prepare the EU for a ‘big bang’ post-1989 enlargement. In fact, it was more of a 
tidying up exercise that recognised the increasing importance of flexibility within the 
EU system and introduced a new provision that could allow the Union as a whole to 
	   12	  
sanction a Member State that stepped significantly out of line in relation to matters of 
democracy, the rule of law, or fundamental rights.  
Most recently, we have the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009. 
This treaty was once more rejected and then later approved by Irish voters in two 
referendums. It revised and reviewed the overall structure of the treaties so that the 
basis for primary EU law is now the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, removing the historic ‘community’ and ‘union’ 
‘pillar’ distinction between the more supranational and more intergovernmental 
aspects of the EU’s work. It introduced significant changes in the area of external 
policy (both commercial policy and foreign and security policy) and completed the 
process of mainstreaming most areas of justice and home affairs cooperation, under 
the ordinary legislative procedure. The treaty also established that the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, originally adopted in a non-treaty and non-legally binding 
format in 2000 (‘solemnly proclaimed’), had the same legal value as the treaties. This 
has resulted in the CJEU making more substantial use of the rights contained in the 
Charter in its case law, notwithstanding the efforts of the Member States to ringfence 
the scope of the Charter by reference to the secope of EU law. 
In fact, the roots of the Lisbon Treaty can also be traced to the beginning of 
the 2000s when the Member States started preparing for what became known as the 
Constitutional Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty does not appear on the list of 
amending treaties, as it never came into force. Like the Charter of Rights, it was 
originally negotiated in a Convention, which comprised representatives not only of 
Member State governments, but also of national parliaments, the European 
Parliament, and the European Commission. Empowered by the Laeken Declaration of 
the European Council, the Convention worked via plenary deliberation, the 
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circulation of papers and drafts, along with working groups with focused tasks. Much 
of the work of the Convention was in public, eschewing in large part the ‘behind-
closed-doors negotiation-amongst-diplomats’ style of an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC). That said, it was widely regarding as working ‘under the shadow’ 
of the IGC – in other words, it did not enjoy a free hand, regardless of the likely 
wishes of the Member States. On that which was politically feasible could be included 
in the Constitutional Treaty – or so the argument went. 
The Constitutional Treaty finalised by the Convention in 2003 was largely 
adopted in unchanged form by the governments of the Member States and formally 
adopted and signed in an IGC in 2004. Despite having been subjected to the political 
sense-test of an IGC, it did not prove congenial to voters. It was decisively rejected in 
referendums held in France and the Netherlands in 2005. As a result, ratification was 
never completed and the treaty was set aside. The results in these referendums gave 
rise to a further crisis of confidence about the trajectory and sustainability of the EU 
as an evolving polity, but this did not deter the Member States from picking up much 
of the material contained in the Constitutional Treaty and putting it into the Treaty of 
Lisbon under a different form just two years later. However, although it had much of 
the same content and achieved most of the same legal effects, the Treaty of Lisbon as 
presented for national ratification was a text shorn of the symbols of proto-statehood 
to which the Constitutional Treaty referred (flag, anthem, motto). The ‘constitution’ 
moniker was dropped. While the discourse of constitutionalism had become well 
established in scholarship about the EU, after the demise of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the term has largely disappeared from official discourse. On the contrary, the only 
constitutional requirements and traditions to which the Treaty of Lisbon refers are 
those of the Member States. 
	   14	  
One can summarise these ebbs and flows as follows: the post-Lisbon treaty 
basis for the European Union looks quite different to the post-SEA European 
Community, which contained only a separate ‘leg’ of tentative intergovernmental 
European political cooperation in the foreign policy sphere. Now foreign and security 
policy is more completely mainstreamed, even if still incomplete. And yet the basic 
institutional structure – although more complex than it was in the 1980s – is still 
recognisably the same one, rooted in the idea of a European Commission (as an 
embryonic European executive), the European Parliament (directly elected since 
1979), the Council of Ministers (with much of its work prepared by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives) and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
regular meetings of the heads of state or government, which have taken place since 
the early 1970s, have been institutionalised as the European Council, which now has 
its own President elected by the leaders and accountable essentially to them. 
Meanwhile the President of the Commission remains politically accountable to the 
European Parliament, and in 2014 the Parliament unilaterally implemented the so-
called ‘leading candidates’ (Spitzenkandidaten) scheme. That is, the European 
political parties each chose their candidates for Commission President and indicated 
to the heads of state or government in the European Council that they in turn should 
choose the candidate for the party which came first in the EP elections, rather than 
any other candidate. This was how Jean-Claude Juncker came to be President of the 
Commission, with a mandate directly stemming from the success of the European 
People’s Party in the 2014 EP elections. He was not a priori choice of most of the 
members of the European Council, and indeed they somewhat reluctantly accepted 
the fait accompli (or did not accept it, in the case of UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron). There also remains a ‘national’ presidency circulating amongst the 
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Member States on a six monthly basis, but its importance in preparing the legislative 
work of the European Union or acting as a symbolic political reference point is much 
downgraded compared to the capacity of the presidency between the 1980s and the 
2000s to act as a catalyst for change (or conversely a brake on new developments). 
Finally, to form a bridge between the Commission and the European Council, the 
Member States have created the position of High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The territorial scope of the EU has also changed dramatically since the 1980s. 
Much of this change can be attributed to the effects of the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990 (which effected an internal enlargement 
to absorb East Germany) and the break up of the Soviet Union (in 1991) and 
Yugoslavia (from 1992 onwards). As with Greece, Spain and Portugal, as they 
emerged into the arena of liberal democracy, so the new democracies of central and 
eastern Europe and – to a lesser extent – south-east Europe have been brought into the 
fold of the EU. There are now 28 Member States (with only Croatia joining since the 
last treaty revision entered into force), and there have been numerous referendums on 
membership since the 1970s, with only Norway, in 1972, opting not to join after 
signing an accession treaty. In particular in the Western Balkans, there are a large 
number of prospective new Member States, with Serbia and Montenegro at the head 
of the queue. Enlargement talks with Turkey have foundered. Although Iceland flirted 
briefly with membership in the wake of the chaos wrought by the financial crisis and 
the failure of its banks in the late 2000s, this has not been taken further. Nor have 
Switzerland’s periodic flirtations with membership amounted to anything substantial. 
However, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are firmly linked to the EU through the 
European Economic Area agreement, which creates a framework for single-market-
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like cooperation between those states (which are members of the European Free Trade 
Association); Switzerland, meanwhile, maintains a close bilateral relationship with 
the EU based on a complex and often contested network of treaties. 
As of 2016, the EU has been facing its most serious existential crisis yet, in 
the wake of the UK’s referendum vote by 52% to 48% to leave the EU on 23 June 
2016. At the time of writing the form of the UK’s future relationship with the EU and 
its Member States (to be concluded under Article 217 TFEU) was wholly unclear and 
Article 50 TEU, which lays down the process for a Member State to leave, had not 
even been triggered by the UK Government. The position is complicated by the UK’s 
own internal territorial complexities: Scotland and Northern Ireland voted ‘remain’, 
while Wales and England (much the largest part of the union state) voted to leave. 
Within England, London – the capital – voted to remain. The UK’s referendum vote 
is just one amongst a number of signals of a growing malaise amongst the populations 
of the Member States about the idea of the EU as a constitutional and continental 
destiny for the cooperation between states in Europe. Euroscepticism, in various 
guises, is present in every Member State, and especially publicly visible amongst the 
substantial numbers of Members of the European Parliament elected every five years 
who represent Eurosceptic parties. 
In policy terms, the EU is also much changed. It engages with a wider range of 
policy areas, which are intended to foster closer integration between the Member 
States; these extend into the monetary, security, justice, and home affairs areas as well 
as the traditional trade domains. Beyond the focus on trade in goods, which was the 
main emphasis of the Single European Market, there have been increasing attempts to 
create better conditions for the cross border mobility of services. It has also stepped 
further into political domains closer to the core of Member State sovereignty with the 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, now enshrined in the treaties, and the establishment 
of a concept of European citizenship, dating back to the Treaty of Maastricht, but 
given additional substance of a number of key rulings of the CJEU during the 2010s. 
But at the same time, the introduction and implementation of new competences has 
gone hand in hand with greater differentiation (in particular for the Eurozone, as 
discussed below) and systematic use of opt-outs. This applies to the arrangements for 
the removal of internal frontiers (Schengen), for the UK and Ireland, and to various 
other aspects of Justice and Home Affairs for the UK, Ireland and – in its own way – 
Denmark. In addition, enlargement has led to enhanced differentiation, so that some 
states cannot yet, for example, join Schengen, even though they may wish to do so 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia). 
Things have not always gone smoothly for the EU. The Eurozone was 
established on 1 January 1999, and now comprises 19 of the 28 Member States. Yet it 
is widely accepted that (a) the Eurozone was not established with an appropriate 
framework to enable it effectively to withstand asymmetric shocks or serious 
sovereign debt crises facing one or more Member States and (b) shortcuts were taken 
with the original entry criteria, as a result of which several states, most notably but not 
only Greece, entered the Eurozone under conditions in which its public finances were 
not in sufficiently robust order to resist the type of crisis that occurred from 2008 
onwards. These asymmetries could be said to represent the EU’s true ‘crisis’ (Kumm 
2013). Consequently, there have been further treaty developments in this domain, to 
cope with the problems that have arisen, but none of them have involved all of the 
Member States. These are the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 
amongst the 19 Eurozone members, which has been set up as a permanent source of 
financial assistance for those members, which experience difficulties. Another 
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separate intergovernmental mechanism, which includes some but not all of the non-
Eurozone EU Member States (the UK, the Czech Republic and Croatia did not 
participate) is the European Fiscal Compact Treaty, intended to operate as a more 
effective version of the stability and growth pact which fosters fiscal self discipline 
amongst the Eurozone members and those other EU Member States that have chosen 
to opt in. Such treaties, which bind only those states that participate, do not amend the 
existing treaty structure, but they necessarily cast a shadow upon the wider treaty 
framework in terms of their clear preference to defend the integrity of the euro as a 
currency in a robust manner. Indeed the choice of treaty (as opposed to legislative) 
mechanisms operates as an important signal of the seriousness with which the 
contracting states regard such matters. 
So where do we now stand with the EU and constitutionalism? 
It is clear that the early part of the 2000s saw an optimism that the EU was 
moving into a new ‘constitutional’ era, supported not only by the abundant scholarly 
writing exploring the applicability of constitutional ideas and practices in the context 
of the EU, but also by the willingness of political elites to invoke the ‘c’ word. This 
came during what we can call the ‘future of the Union’ period. This is the rather brief 
interregnum between the Laeken Declaration of 2000 and the referendums in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005, which saw rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. What 
underpinned this constitutional high water mark was a widely held elite commitment 
to the principle that, notwithstanding the concerns raised by the Danish referendum on 
the Treaty of Maastricht and the Irish electorate on the Treaty of Nice, not to mention 
the wariness of national judicial actors including the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the progress towards a more highly institutionalised European Union taking on 
an ever larger range of political, societal and economic challenge was the correct path 
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to follow. This phase seems to be marked by a touching faith in the power of 
institutions to institute not just a formal but also a substantive sense of the EU as a 
constitutional project. But the 2005 referendums represented an important turning 
point, signalling that citizens across more than one Member State were no longer 
heavily invested in the notion that the EU should adopt an expressly constitutional 
form and raising some doubts about the very future of the European integration 
project, which have been amplified since that time. 
Indeed in the last decade, life has not become simpler for those seeking to 
argue that the European integration process – in its current form – represents an 
important ‘constitutionalised’ supplement to the liberal democratic constitutional 
frameworks of the Member States. The challenges facing the EU have multiplied in 
scope and character. They stem from both internal and external sources. We have seen 
a substantial retrenchment towards ‘the national’ and the rejection of supranational 
solutions in many areas. This has occurred even though it continues to be widely 
acknowledged in political spheres that these same challenges require at least in part 
solutions extending beyond national borders. In almost all cases, the EU Member 
States have struggled to find common solutions and to place these within effective 
rule-bound frames at the EU level. Thus we have seen the global financial crisis that 
spiralled into a sovereign debt crisis, and the associated global economic slowdown. 
We have seen the rise of Russia as a regional power, exercising destabilising power in 
the EU’s near abroad, especially in Ukraine. Russia in turn may become more of an 
existential threat to the territorial integrity of the Member States if the US – under 
President Trump – withdraws from its transatlantic NATO guarantees. This places 
additional demands in the area of defence upon the EU. Meanwhile the war in Syria, 
along with the continuing fall out from US-led military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan 
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and Libya, have all contributed to exacerbating the longstanding global crisis of 
refugees and displaced persons. This crisis has moved, in recent years, across the 
external frontiers of the Member States and into the heart of the EU, with the resulting 
mass population movements challenging the sustainability of frontier free travel and 
mobility. Another security challenge has emerged as a result of a larger number of 
terrorist attacks within the Member States, some of them involving people of migrant 
background, but often involving those who are citizens of the country in which the 
attack have taken place. Close to home, there are other types of internal challenge: the 
UK Brexit vote and the anticipated withdrawal negotiations under Article 50 TEU, the 
rise of populist and often far right anti-immigrant politicians in a number of Member 
States, some of whom stand on the brink of power, and the challenges posed to 
constitutional orders, democracy, the rule of law and the authority of EU by the anti-
liberal governments in Poland and Hungary. There remain, too, other longstanding 
challenges, such as the general lack of vitality in the economies of many of the 
Member States (often giving rise to high levels of (especially youth) unemployment, 
and the problems of climate change and global warming that demand a global 
response.  
These challenges can and have demanded responses, which draw upon the 
institutional capacities of the EU to imagine and deliver shared action. While the 
overt ‘Big C’ constitutional language has disappeared from the EU lexicon, the task 
for observers and interpreters of what the EU now does, and how it does it, has been 
to readjust their lenses in order make sense of what might be termed a new phase of 
constitutional dissembling. Just because the language of formal constitutionalism has 
been rejected at the EU level does not mean that it does not make sense still to use 
lenses of constitutionalism – in relation to the rule of law, the balance of competences 
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and the notion of constituent power, as postulated in the introduction to this volume. 
In other words, is ‘Small C’, as witnessed since the 1960s, still operating in the 
context of the EU? I would argue that this question is to be answered in the 
affirmative, with some qualifications related to the new conditions in which the CJEU 
now finds itself. 
What has been noticeable about recent developments in many of the contested 
policy arenas noted above is that so far as there has been EU action it has tended to be 
dominated by executive branches of the Member States, operating in concert in the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council (Dawson and de Witte 2016). 
Parliaments at all levels (regional, national and European) have often been bypassed 
during the urgent search for monetary stability in the wake of the financial crisis, or in 
response to the humanitarian crisis produced by influx of refugees. Especially in the 
context of actions taken in relation to challenges to the viability of the Eurozone, the 
EU institutions have often acted in concert with other intergovernmental actors such 
as the International Monetary Fund or the so-called Troika, that lack democratic 
legitimacy. Some have termed this a ‘turn’ towards a ‘new intergovernmentalism’, 
which has challenged many of the orthodoxies of scholarship on European 
integration, in particular that the institutions are ‘hardwired’ to pursue an ‘ever closer 
union’ (Bickerton, et al, 2015a and 2015b). In that context, as Cardwell and Hervey 
have argued, the use of law has often offered a formal and sometimes problematic 
veneer of legitimacy to many of the steps taken at the international level, which have 
challenged democratic choices made by electorates at the national level (e.g. through 
the replacement of democratically elected governments with governments of 
technocrats, as in Italy) (Cardwell and Hervey 2015). 
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And yet despite this there has been relatively little change in the way that the 
CJEU goes about its business. Its case law demonstrates that it remains concerned 
about protecting the systemic coherence of EU law as system. This is evident, for 
example, in the Opinion which it gave on the draft international agreement providing 
for the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, which it 
argued – notwithstanding there being a specific competence in the treaties to effect 
just this legal outcome – was not compatible with the scope and competences 
conferred by the treaties in their present form. The point is made very clearly in the 
judgment:4 “The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is 
peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and founding principles, a 
particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure 
its operation, has consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of 
accession to the ECHR.” 
In similar terms, the CJEU struck down an EU regulation transposing a UN 
Security Council sanctions resolution imposing an asset freeze on an individual 
suspected of connections with the financing of terrorist activities, on the grounds that 
it was not compatible with the human rights standards applicable within the Union.5 
In both cases, it resisted the importation of external elements into the EU legal order. 
The CJEU might give a similar response if asked to evaluate the potential UK/EU 
agreements both on withdrawal under Article 50 TEU and on post-withdrawal 
‘association’. In both cases, the CJEU would be likely to police sharply the limits of 
the EU’s capacity to conclude external agreements, in order to ensure the autonomy 
and integrity of the internal legal order. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	   Opinion	  2/13	  Draft	  ECHR	  Agreement	  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454,	  para.	  158.	  5	  	   Joined	  cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  P	  Yassin	  Abdullah	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  
International	  Foundation	  v.	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Commission	  of	  the	  
European	  Communities	  ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.	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In the face of a much more extensive treaty framework than in the early years, 
it has harder to find grounds to accuse the CJEU of the greedy accretion of new 
competences in the name of ‘ever closer Union’. Indeed, it rarely invokes that mantra, 
although it famously did so in Pupino, during the interregnum between the creation of 
the so-called third pillar for justice and home affairs competences and the full scale 
‘mainstreaming’ of these competences into the core of the treaties through the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon.6 Moreover, in Pupino, the CJEU 
tendentiously suggested that such ‘third pillar law’ had more in common with classic 
‘European Community law’ than perhaps the framers of the so-called pillar structure 
had originally intended. 
The CJEU has also had to consider what to make of measures taken by the 
Union, and specifically by the European Central Bank, to deal with circumstances in 
the wake of the international financial crisis that threatened the very stability and 
existence of the Eurozone. It has had to decide two controversial cases referred by the 
highest courts of two Member States under Article 267 TFEU. In the Pringle case,7 
the CJEU confirmed the competence of the EU to conclude the ESM Treaty, and in 
the Gauweiler case, the first ever reference made by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the CJEU confirmed the legality of so-called ‘Outright 
Monetary Transactions’ (OMTs), a form of defence for the euro devised by the ECB, 
but never actually used.8 Notably in Gauweiler, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court had previously expressed the view (by a majority) before making the reference 
that the OMTs fell outside the competences of the EU (Fabbrini 2015 and 2016). Yet 
when the case returned to the national court for a final ruling, it was able to avoid an 
outright conflict with the CJEU by repeating – in abstract terms – its strictures about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	   Case	  C-­‐105/03	  Pupino	  ECLI:EU:C:2005:386..	  7	  	   Case	  C-­‐370/12	  Pringle	  ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.	  8	  	   Case	  C-­‐62/14	  Gauweiler	  ECLI:EU:C:2015:400..	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its competence to scrutinize ultra vires EU level measures which impinge upon 
German constitutional integrity, while holding off from taking any practical measures 
because the scope and character of the OMT instrument as interpreted by the CJEU 
did not manifestly exceed the competences of the EU. The national court also stated 
that any future hypothetical use of the OMT instrument would be under its 
supervision. None of this is intended to suggest that the fundamental economic and 
political issues which are raised by the crisis which remains embedded within 
Europe’s monetary system have been solved, but at least the immediate prospect of 
constitutional conflict has been headed off. 
Finally, in this short review of the status quo of constitutionalism in the EU, 
we should turn briefly to some new challenges in the arenas of citizenship and 
fundamental rights. One might reasonably expect the concept of ‘citizenship’, as 
political membership, to have a core role to play within any constitutional system. 
One of the primary incidents of ‘European citizenship’ is the right to vote in European 
Parliament elections. Yet participation in these elections has continued to decline with 
each new election, until that decline was arrested, (but not reversed) in 2014 in many 
Member States. What sort of ‘citizenship’ is there if citizens do not really participate? 
In the judicial sphere, the CJEU was faced in Delvigne with the question whether a 
French restriction on the right to vote in EP elections of prisoners fell within the scope 
of EU law. Answering in the affirmative, it provided a rather narrow interpretation of 
‘citizenship’ for the purposes of EU law, invoking the universal suffrage provisions of 
the treaties and of the Charter of Rights, but insisting that these have a narrow 
application within, and only within the scope of EU competences, i.e. in the case of 
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European Parliament elections alone.9 Such a case does not open the gates to 
establishing a more ‘federal’ and autonomous type of European citizenship. 
Citizenship in the EU is dependent both on the scope of EU competences and upon 
the underpinning role of national citizenship: only citizens of the Member States are 
EU citizens. 
This all suggests that we have something like ‘business as usual’ with EU 
constitutionalism, notwithstanding all of the challenges faced. However, I would 
suggest that this surface impression is in fact misleading and that this conclusion 
needs to be contested. In fact, all is not well is Europe’s legal landscape. Some threats 
are just too powerful to be faced down with the power of liberal legalism. 
Conclusion  
The liberal ‘legalised’ form of constitutionalism, which has served the 
European Union so well for more than forty years is under threat. It may not survive 
the backlash of populist politics. It is no longer about the Big C or the small c, but 
about survival altogether. By the end of 2016, EU constitutionalism was standing at a 
crossroads. There remains a distinct possibility that the EU may collapse as a result of 
existential challenges such as Brexit and the claims articulated by a number of 
populist politicians who stand on the threshold of power, such as Le Pen (France), 
Hofer (Austria), Wilders (the Netherlands), even Grillo (Italy) that further 
referendums on the euro and on membership should be held in other Member States. 
All of this suggests that the era of ‘postnationalism’, if it ever began, is now over for 
the EU.  
But so long as these are risks not realities, it is worth observing that the old 
‘order’ has largely survived the challenges posed by the financial crisis and austerity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	   C-­‐650/13	  Delvigne	  v.	  Commune	  de	  Lesparre	  Médoc	  and	  Préfet	  de	  la	  Gironde	  ECLI:EU:C:2015:648.	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measures unscathed, as the previous paragraphs have shown. On the whole the EU 
has benefited from what Grimm (2012) has called ‘overconstitutionalisation’ – 
namely the rendering into primary law (and thus the buttressing of a high level of 
unamendability) of many elements of socio-economic choice that in most national 
systems are the subject of ordinary politics, not constitutional politics. This has 
created a degree of stability, at the same time as opening the EU to the charge that it is 
not capable of reacting effectively to changed external or internal circumstances 
(Grimm 2015). One example of this phenomenon, in the view of some, is the rigidity 
of the EU’s commitment to free movement of persons as an element of the single 
market. And yet what other approach is feasible for a legal edifice constructed on a 
framework of economic integration and a justiciable principle of non-discrimination? 
Even if the EU were to do what some have counselled, which is to revert to the pre-
Maastricht ‘state of innocence’, in practice this would not change this particular 
dilemma, in which free movement of persons has come to be seen as one of the 
problems that the EU causes, as well as being one of its most valued contributions to 
the lives of its citizens. 
Returning to the elements of constitutionalism identified in the introduction, it 
is clear that internally EU has been strongest in relation to the defence of the rule of 
law, and less capable of articulating a sophisticated defence of a model of 
constitutionalism based on the separation of powers or an effective notion of a 
constituent power. And yet that too is under threat, with defiance of the EU rule of 
law now rife as we see a resurgence of authoritarianism threatening constitutionalism 
in various parts of central and Eastern Europe in particular, but also a populist 
discourse in the UK that suggests that non-state courts are very much part of the 
problem, from the perspective of popular acceptance or rejection of European 
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integration, rather than part of the solution, which was arguably the happy role that 
the CJEU was able to claim in the early years. This can be seen also in opposition – in 
Wallonia but also elsewhere in the EU – to the inclusion of various forms of 
supranational judicial decision-making in the external agreements that the EU is 
seeking to make with third countries, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between Canada and the EU, in order to protect the interests of investors 
and traders. The legitimacy of such tribunals is in question. 
The original objectives of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of European 
integration concerned the promotion of peace, prosperity and a form of non-
nationalist supranationalism. In many respects, the EU has been remarkably 
successful, given the history of the European continent right through to the middle of 
the twentieth century. The ‘constitutionalised treaties’ have been at the heart of that 
success, but in the era of national reactions against neo-liberalism and globalisation, 
the role of the EU and specifically of the CJEU is increasingly under question. It 
appears that the conviction that law represents an effective mechanism for buttressing 
the external commitments of states is waning away. It would seem fair to suggest that 
if the EU is to feature in a future handbook on constitutionalism beyond the state or 
global constitutionalism in twenty years time, then a degree of reinvention and 
reconsideration is going to be needed. 
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